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This paper approaches active management of baskets of currencies from the perspective 
of Complexity theory, where the market is analysed as a Complex Adaptive system. A 
basket of currencies is constructed using objective probabilities (propensities) and an 
artificial intelligence optimization technique that allows for implicit learning of 
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This paper focuses on active management under the framework of Complexity theory, 
where the market is analysed as a Complex Adaptive system. The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) is scrutinized from the perspective of the dynamics of the interaction 
between agents that may have heterogeneous expectations at a microscopic level. The 
case for the use of propensities as a complement to the subjective probabilities approach 
is made. An artificial-intelligence-based investment process that searches for the 
optimal portfolio – given a set of propensities – is designed, so that it will maximize the 
information ratio under the constraint that the implicit structure of correlations of the 
resulting portfolio will respond to changes in the environment – factor dynamics and the 
diversification benefits are significant. An illustration of the benefits of this approach to 
active management is presented with an investment process for currency baskets, 
complemented with statistical tests    
2. Theoretical support for active management 
2.1. EMH: Continuity between the microscopic and macroscopic descriptions.  
 
Traditional financial theory focuses on equilibrium, which in turn establishes an 
apparent continuity between the macroscopic and the microscopic descriptions of the 
market by means of the homogeneity of the agents’ expectations. The microscopic 
properties of financial systems are typically represented in terms of agents’ 
expectations, wealth and risk aversion. Of interest, however, are observable 
macroscopic quantities such as the market’s return and risk. The goal is to predict the 
relationships among these macroscopic variables, starting from knowledge of the 
equations that rule agents’ interaction and the space of the entire system’s microscopic 
state. Two basic assumptions allow current financial theories to connect the microscopic 
description (collection of microstates and equations of interaction) to the macroscopic 
behaviour. The first one is homogeneity in agents’ expectations homogeneity, which 
ensures that price changes are random and that agents know the true probability 
distribution of the stochastic returns. The second is the assumption of “self-averaging” 
in which the macro-state variables are only expressible in term of themselves. That is,   4
the macroscopic description does not require knowledge of the detailed statistics of the 
microscopic variables. For instance, computation of expected return does not require 
knowledge of the positions held by different investors in the asset, nor their risk 
aversion. 
 
Standard theory assumes identical agents who are perfectly rational, and given a similar 
information set, independently arrive at a shared logical conclusion or expectation about 
the environment they face. From this perspective, single-period asset pricing models of 
mean-variance maximising investors
2 imply that all market participants will agree on 
the appropriate risk premium for each asset. Thus, a passive strategy is efficient in this 
context and no agent has any incentive to create and implement new strategies as prices 
fully incorporate the expectations and information of all market participants and are 
completely random and unpredictable. Specifically, no information set should help 
reduce the forecast error made by an individual. This independence of forecast errors is 
known as the orthogonality property. It must be noted however that markets will be 
informationally efficient only if a sufficient proportion of the agents actively gather and 
trade on information in order to (instantaneously) preclude arbitrage opportunities.  
 
From a microscopic perspective, ex-ante any set of active strategies will be expected to 
perform as well as any other, as price changes are unpredictable. Two agents with equal 
risk aversion and wealth will be indifferent to the implementation of any specific active 
strategy. As with Boltzmann’s notion of entropy, the probability is highest when 
uniformity is achieved. In this case all investors would “know” the true probability 
distribution of the stochastic returns. The macroscopic characterisation of such a system 
is easily performed, as it is independent of the microscopic characterisation
3.  
 
The determinism implicit in the supposed ability of agents to accurately assimilate any 
information relevant to the determination and adjustment of asset prices is only 
conceivable for an observer situated outside that market. It is a vision of a timeless 
world, which excludes man from the reality it describes.  
                                                 
2 In a “perfect” market where: 1. No taxes on returns are paid; 2. No transaction costs on trades exist; 3. All assets are marketable 
and perfectly divisible; 4. Unlimited short sales are permitted as well as risk-free borrowing and lending. 
3  An analogy exists between the concept of informational efficiency that results form Samuelson’s (1962) Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) and frictionless physical systems: an image similar to the world as we perceive it while participating in the 
markets, must not be sought within the context of these models. In fact, even if the engineer knows that he cannot eliminate friction, 
he estimates that such a model can nonetheless render the analysis of the complex reality easier (Samuelson, 1962).    
   5
However, as Arrow (1988) asserts, economic theory has emphasised in amplitude-
reducing behaviour or negative feedbacks. An economy with decentralized knowledge 
reaches equilibrium by a tâtonnement process where positive excess demand will result 
in higher prices and supply that ultimately offset the initial perturbation. Arrow (1988) 
argues that it has been acknowledged that the numerous interrelations within the 
economy ‘might cause instability even though each reaction was stabilizing in its first-
order effects’. This is illustrated by the dynamics of the prices of demand-
interdependent products: for example, bread and butter. An excess of demand for bread 
would be expected to have the results described above; however a reduction in the price 
of butter (to correct an excess of supply) can ultimately increase the demand for bread, 
amplifying the initial excess of demand. 
 
Nash equilibria (1950a, 1950b) are not necessarily compatible with rational equilibrium 
results, which presuppose that each player has complete information about the other 
players’ situation. Moreover, if a given game admits more than one Nash equilibrium, 
the equilibrium selection criteria cannot be used for the prediction of the game’s 
outcome. Modifications to reduce the number of equilibria or avoid unwanted results in 
economic terms (Selten, 1975), or to account for incomplete information (Harsanyi, 
1967) by defining distinct players with different sets of preferences, also fail to account 
for the evolution (in time) of the economy.       
 
In terms of the dynamic evolution, it is clear that it is the coherent interaction between 
many dispersed entities acting in parallel that determine the course of the economy, or 
in particular of financial markets. Coherent in this context means that some 
characteristic activities – e.g. price formation through trading – require the cooperation 
of these entities (Prigogine, 1983).  
 
Economic systems do not act only in terms of stimulus and response, the entities also 
anticipate and may even be structurally modified by their interactions: perpetual novelty 
and continual adaptation by the acquisition of experience are also present (Arthur et al., 
1997). A discussion on the emergence of order, either from fluctuations (Prigogine, 
1983, 1991), positive feedbacks (Arthur, 1988; Arrow, 1988; Anderson, 1988) and/or 
from the dynamical interaction between the process and the environment (Lewin, 1992;   6
Langton, 1989; Holland, 1998; Arthur et al., 1997; Cariani, 1992; Forrest, 1989; 
Kaufmann, 1989) and their implications are discussed in Reveiz (2001). 
 
Moreover, as foresight and game-playing have a preponderant role in economics, the 
predictor is part of the system being predicted. This may yield difficulties of 
mathematical consistency unless the assumption is made that each player decides on his 
strategy ignoring what other agents may do. But experience in financial markets shows 
that participants are also trying to predict what other participants will do. In this context, 
the interaction between the economic entities may be asymmetric as Francois Perroux 
already posited in 1964. Going a little further than Perroux‘s insight, economic trading 
is not an homogeneous space as the interaction of A with B may not only convey 
information and exchange but may also lead to the modification of the structure of one 
of the units. More precisely, from the interaction B may change the model, the 
information it is using, its risk aversion, etc.  
 
Economies, Markets and Agents are not isolated systems. Exchange of information and 
models – belief sets – with the external world (markets, economies, etc.) are part of an 
ongoing process. The problem of establishing the limits of the system, as well as the 
definition of the units and their interactions becomes critical because, in some way, each 
is conditioned on the other.  
2.2. Deductive and inductive reasoning and homogeneous and heterogeneous 
expectations. 
 
Over the past few decades, numerous, sometimes complementary, approaches to 
economic systems have grown from this perspective. An evolutionary framework, in 
which markets, instruments, institutions, and investors interact and evolve dynamically, 
and in which constant adaptation and perpetual novelty are integral parts of the 
development of the system, is common to all of these approaches.  
 
The underpinning factor in all these approaches is the recognition that agents are 
heterogeneous and dynamically incoherent. Most of them assume either rational or 
bounded rational agents (Simon, 1982). The implications of the relaxation of this 
assumption are significant as the continuity between the microscopic and macroscopic   7
description is broken as the result of the agents’ inability to form expectations by 
deduction through knowledge of other agents’ expectations (Arthur, 1995).   
 
Arguments against the assumption of homogeneous expectations assert that traders, the 
same agents modelled by the theory, devise active strategies to outperform the “market” 
as they believe that the market offers speculative opportunities. Also, the trade-off 
between risk and return underlying modern financial theory implies that a reward is 
demanded by investors in order to hold an asset and bear the subsequent risk.   
Furthermore, a sufficiently risk-averse investor may be willing to pay to avoid the risk 
of holding a security. In this context, prices need not be unpredictable even if markets 
are efficient and agents act rationally (Farmer and Lo, 1999).  
 
Others consider the hypothesis of full rationality as unrealistic because it is conceptually 
difficult to define what rationality is, and observe that human behaviour is 
unpredictable. They also make the point that irrational behaviour is present in everyday 
life. In addition, as information is difficult to interpret, and significant “news” must be 
selected and its impact determined, agents’ resulting expectations may differ. What's 
more, information gathering is costly and not all investors may be capable or willing to 
use significant resources for that purpose. Besides, technology is continually changing 
and the players who use this technology first may acquire, at least temporarily, a 
competitive advantage
4. The emergence of derivatives markets is a good example of this 
phenomenon.  
 
An additional point must be made. If we consider as Rabindranath Tagore did that 
independently of what we think reality is, we can only access it through mental 
synthesis, then no information can be discounted into the price without there also being 
a relevant theoretical framework. And, as we know, distinct models may give rise to 
different interpretations
5.  
                                                 
4 Farmer and Lo (1999) provide an illustration of the absurd implications of the application of the EMH to a biotechnology firm 
trying to develop a vaccine against AIDS: under that framework “such a vaccine can never be developed – if it could someone 
would have already done it!”  This conclusion is reached because the challenges and gestation lags of biotechnology research are not 
taken into account.  Continuing with their argument, if a company succeeded in developing such a vaccine, profits would be very 
high. But would these be considered abnormal profits or just appropriate compensation for their efforts, skills and innovation? 
Finally, they argue that financial markets should not be different.             
5 In this context, we are closer to the German notion of grund than the Latin notion of ratio, reason. According to Kundera (1990), 
the latter has two senses: ‘before designating the cause it designates the faculty of reasoning. Thus, the reason in terms of cause is 
always perceived as rational. A reason, for which the corresponding rationality is not transparent, seems unable to cause an effect. 
However, in German, the reason in terms of cause is expressed as grund, a word completely unattached to the Latin ratio, which 
designates the ground first and then a fundamental [translation by the author]’ (Kundera, 1990).      8
As Arthur et al. (1997), Holland (1988) and Prigogine (1983) assert in their own 
terminology and respective fields, systems with the properties mentioned above operate 
far from any global or optimum equilibrium (Out-of-Equilibrium dynamics) and 
together they present difficulties for traditional mathematics (used in economics). For 
Holland, the economy is an adaptive non-linear network (ANN), as are ecologies, the 
nervous system and the developmental stages of multi-cellular organisms. 
 
Complexity theory (Gell-Mann, 1995) gives us insight into emergent properties in 
macroscopic systems that take place (mainly) through feedback mechanisms from the 
dispersed interaction of the agents at the microscopic level. The implicit use of 
induction by the entities to adapt to their environment leads to perpetual novelty and 
keeps the system away from optimal or global equilibrium in the traditional sense.  
  
Historical change is then the result of the interaction of competing microscopic entities 
that, through their actions, arising from their set of preferences or needs, co-create 
history by producing events which modify prevailing structures. Intensity and speed of 
change are related to the amplification and feedback mechanisms. Moreover, a 
collectively-shared objective, although possible, would result in equilibrium
6 (no 
change in the structures, therefore no historical change). It seems more likely that 
heterogeneous objectives, and the actions taken in pursuit of them, shape the engine of 
the historical process, which by continued adaptation to the environment (changes in 
structures and hierarchies) is continuously revised and reasserted
7. 
 
If we view the economy or the markets as an adaptive complex system or in Holland’s 
(1988) words as an adaptive nonlinear network, structure matters. It does so in many 
ways:  
 
(i.) Surfacing of patterns at the microscopic level might result in emergent properties at 
the macroscopic level by amplification mechanisms such as order by fluctuations, 
positive feedbacks and/or process-environment dynamics. 
 
                                                 
6 This is in accordance with traditional financial theory where agents share the same information set and the market responds only to 
the arrival of new information, being otherwise in equilibrium. 
7 This view shares the underlying basic assumption in Sartre’s work at the end of his life, ‘that all human affairs are conducted under 
conditions of relative scarcity. For this implies that humans always confront each other as potential competitors, and, according to 
Sartre, it is this threat which both motivates all social and economic structures, and, in the end unifies history’ (Baldwin, 1995).         9
(ii.) Institutions or conventions (frozen structures) define hierarchy or mitigate positive 
feedbacks or emergent behaviour. 
 
(iii.) The compression of past information within the structure of the models and 
procedures used to predict risk and return and to measure the fitness of distinct 
strategies makes historical narratives significant. More specifically, because agents 
learn from experience, prevailing procedures at all hierarchical levels are a function of 
past performance. 
 
(iv.) Networks are important in two ways. Clusters of linked agents may affect the 
evolution of the market by affecting information transmission or trading practices. On 
the other hand, if agents modify their expectations (models, information, risk aversion, 
etc) by interacting with others, then the precise way in which economic units are linked 
determines the set of possible modifications.     
 
More precisely, by modelling price formation as the result of actions taken by the agents 
(traders) on their co-evolving set of strategies, in which each agent tries to forecast the 
other agents’ behaviour and trade is not carried out in a neoclassical auction-like 
process but is the result only of a bid and ask price match (double auction), locally the 
market may have “open” orders (unfulfilled holding desires). The evolution of these, the 
surfacing of structure – for example, most of the market wants to be long while the 
central bank becomes the liquidity provider - or its degradation and prospective return 
to symmetry, mixed with feedback mechanisms and critical mass thresholds result in 
emergent, sometimes non-equilibrium, behaviour at the macroscopic level. A similar 
approach can be taken regarding the dynamics of the actual holdings or the fitness of 
traders’ strategies.         
 
As with any non-linear adaptive system, in financial markets, distinct notions of 
historical change arise depending upon either the resolution chosen to analyse the 
system’s evolution or the objects of interest. In order to create their price expectation, 
agents use fundamental, econometric or rule-based models that are chosen only on the 
strength of their performance. By definition, forecasting with these rules is based on the   10
assumption that time is deterministic where a set of events gives us a sense of continuity 
and the future can be described by some combination of occurrence of such events
8.  
 
Agents are only interested in fulfilling their objective of generating returns with no 
underlying [known or desired] finality. As long as all of the strategies have similar 
fitness and no persistent correlation emerges between their positions or strategies as a 
result of their interaction, the market (macro level) is near to equilibrium and in 
Prigogine’s (1991) view, no history is being made. On the other hand, if through an 
amplification of a fluctuation or a feedback mechanism, structure appears or 
dramatically changes leading to an out-of-equilibrium situation at the macro level, we 
can affirm that ‘history’ is being made. In this sense, the creation/destruction of new 
institutions, conventions or models provides us with a sense of irreversibility in 
financial markets. 
 
Although closely related to Karl Popper’s and Ilya Prigogine’s work on an evolutionary 
approach to objective knowledge and out-of-equilibrium dynamics in thermodynamics, 
respectively, Complexity Theory seldom refers to these authors
9. However, concepts 
such as reflexivity, positive feedbacks and their role in the creation of perpetual novelty, 
for example, or the observation that microscopic coherence and out-of-equilibrium 
behaviour at the macroscopic level may occur simultaneously, were posited by these 
authors since in the early eighties. There is no doubt that, on some fronts, Complexity 
Theory has outgrown these theories, mainly in the study of emergence. However, these 
concepts, form part of a broader theoretical exposition of the work of these authors, 
which may in turn enhance our understanding of the repercussions of applying these 
concepts in, say, economics as well as provide a better theoretical foundation on which 
to construct our hypotheses. 
 
The attribution of learning abilities to the economic agents (Arthur et al, 1997), 
combined with a price-formation mechanism that results from an ecology of competing 
strategies, yields an ill-defined problem where self-referencing exists. Popper (1982) 
has shown that, when we try to predict a system from within, ‘a predictor cannot predict 
the result of its own predictions – at least not before the ‘predicted’ event has actually 
                                                 
8 Although an error in the prediction is allowed. 
9 The concept of reflexivity was applied in finance by George Soros (1998), who references Popper’s work.   11
taken place’. Moreover, he asserts that ecologies of predictors that influence each other 
can be highly unstable with a loss of efficiency in individual predictors. This is in 
consistent with the results obtained by the Santa Fe Institute Market and supports the 
case for active management.  
 
Complexity Theory posits that the dynamics of a process are affected by its geometry 
(structure), which in turn changes as the process evolves, leading to a feedback 
mechanism that in turn generates perpetual novelty. This process cannot be completely 
understood with the use of subjective probabilities where uncertainty is due to our own 
lack of knowledge. The notion of objective probabilities or propensities (Popper, 1982), 
an extension of the concept of force, may provide insight to the analysis of evolutionary 
dynamics as the situation, and not solely the object, changes the possibilities. 
 
Subjective probability is considered to be useful only because we have imperfect 
knowledge: probability is a property of some given sequence. In the case of objective 
probability the sequence is determined by its set of generating conditions: probability is 
then a property of the generating conditions (Popper, 1983). It refers not only to 
individual events but also to the possibilities inherent in the conditions under which that 
event occurs. It refers to the possibilities opened up by the conditions. Propensities are 
conceptually similar to Newtonian forces in that they are a relational property of at least 
two things. Turning up heads or tails from tossing a coin is not solely a property of the 
coin but also of the tossing. As Popper explains, if the coin is dropped into sand or mud, 
we may find lower probabilities as it may come to rest upright
10.        
 
Thus, if price formation results from the interaction of competing strategies and beliefs 
that may be successful under specific environments and which are based on models that 
evolve through the interaction, both with other agents and the environment, then a 
positive feedback between market dynamics and structure exists, as well as an increase 
in average fitness in the models and technology (quantitative tools). In this context, 
market participants are confronted with novelty permanently which in turn leads to an 
inherent forecasting fallibility in expected returns.  
                                                 
10 The geometry-dynamics duality of complexity theory can be better understood if the notion of propensities is included. Changes 
in the system geometry (environment) determine the possible paths which the system may follow at each time step which in turn, 
when a given path is selected, may modify the geometry of the system, opening up a new set of possibilities.  Any given path taken 
by the system – the occurrence of a given set of propensities – is a property of the whole system, a relational property.       12
 
Under this framework, it can be argued that active management can lead to excess 
returns but it is clear that a strategy will outperform only under some environments 
when the propensities and their interaction with the environment are accounted for in 
the models and beliefs
11. This is supported by the empirical observation that 
consistently obtaining positive excess returns is hardly attainable. In order to obtain 
excess returns in the long run, an investment process, as well as the metrics and 
technology implemented, must account for forecasting fallibility by providing support 
in providing procedures and portfolios that are fit under changing propensities and 
environments given specific views of the portfolio manager – the investment process 
must be designed as a complex adaptive system itself. 
3. Active Management as a complex adaptive system: an illustration 
3.1. The Investment Process 
 
For illustrative purposes, we define the universe of assets allowed for active 
management as the 10 currencies in table 1.  












Our propensities for these currencies’ returns are determined in a three step process, 
allowing for both global and local factors to be taken into account. First, exposures to 
the following global risk factors are set in a periodic meeting: (i) Pro or anti dollar 
exposure: (ii) Market risk aversion; (iii) Commodities’ Prices and (iv) local or trend 
volatility. Factors (i) to (iii) are replicated using sets of “pure” portfolios (“baskets” of 
currencies) estimated using artificial intelligence techniques. Second, separate signals 
                                                 
11 For the evolutionary fitness implications of these phenomena see Reveiz (2001).   13
are produced for each currency from carry and volatility differences, spot curve 
information and technical analysis. Then, the portfolio manager (FX Team), with the 
support of the economic team and taking into account market dynamics, determines the 
specific propensities for each currency by complementing the information embedded in 
the “factor” portfolios and the specific market signals– see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – Illustration of a FX investment process 
 
 
The set of signals is optimized using a Genetic Algorithm (SACD) from a population of 
portfolios that obtained the highest information ratio, while presenting an asymmetric 
exposure to shocks to the base currency factor. To obtain the optimal portfolio – in the 
propensities framework – this population is filtered using conditional heterescedasticy 
and diversification benefits indicators, as well as their exposure to global factors. 
Finally a stress test is performed to the basket to ensure its fitness to a varying 
environment. 
 
For illustrative purposes, Figure 2 below shows the information ratio for a 5 year 
period, the accumulated return and the frequency histogram of the information ratios for 
the currencies’ basket in table 2.   14














The information ratio varies between .7 and –0.7, whilst the Information ratio histogram 
is skewed to the right.   
 
 
Figure 2 – Information Ratio (IR), Returns and IR histogram 
 
The diversification benefits, the IR using GARCH models and the Value at Risk 
(GARCH) are presented in figure 3.   
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Figure 3 – Diversification Benefit, Information Ratio and VaR (GARCH)   
  
The diversification benefit reaches 85%, slightly over 55%, while the daily Value at 
Risk is around US$10000 per million of net base currency exposure at the end of the 
period. The dispersion of the diversification benefit depicts the active dynamics of the 
implicit correlations – this is what the algorithm learns.      
 
When positive and negative shocks were applied to the basket, as a stress test, using 
simulations, the resulting information ratios are 0.4409 and -0.1098 respectively. 
3.2. Analysis of Results 
3.2.1. Diversification benefits 
 
In order to test the ability of the algorithm to obtain high diversification benefits, 31 
random sets of signals (currencies’ propensities) were optimized to obtain the 
correspondent currency baskets.  The histogram shows that for a million of base 
currency exposure, the one year volatility is lower than 10% consistently – see figure 4.  
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Mean        7.997568
Median    7.675800
Maximum   9.949100
Minimum   6.231100
Std. Dev.    1.135277
Skewness    0.160471




Figure 5 presents the evolution of a basket of currencies with and without 
diversification. 
 
Figure 5 – Illustration Diversification Benefit 
 
 
3.2.2. Asymmetric correlation 
 
An experiment was designed to test for asymmetric response to positive and negative 
shocks. Random sets of signals are optimized by the Sub-symbolic Learning 
Asymmetric Correlation Algorithm (SACD). The best 5 baskets of the final “best” 
population for each run, without final filters, is impacted with positive a negative 
shocks, from a signal perspective – i.e. is a pro-dollar stance is implicit in the signals 










With diversification No diversification  17
information ratio is estimated in both cases and the net information ratio is computed
12. 
If the latter is significantly different from zero, the algorithm was able to properly learn 
the dynamics of the correlations between the currencies in differing environments. 
Results show that consistently, for all the resulting “best populations”, the net 
information ratio is positive – see figure 6.  
 
Figure 6 – Net Information Ratio Histogram 













4 HISTOGRAM (Net information Ratio)
 
As it is shown in figure 1, the distribution has an asymmetric form with a skewness 
measure of 0.0524.          
4. Conclusions 
 
Viewing market dynamics as a Complex Adaptive System allows, conceptually, for 
both the emergence of novelty and a positive feedback loop between market structure 
and dynamics is of utmost importance. The former can be approached by the 
correlation’s structure which is modified with market dynamics. An artificial-
intelligence based investment process was presented that searches for the optimal 
                                                 
12 This histogram shows the distribution of the sum of the historical IR under a positive and a negative random shock. Shocks were 
applied to a set of the best 52 historical baskets previously calculated by the GA. Seven “positive” and 7 “negative” shocks were 
chosen and  5040 simulations were executed in order to obtain 1,834,560 observations.   18
portfolio – given a set of propensities
13 – that will maximize the information ratio under 
the constraint that the implicit structure of correlations of the resulting portfolio will 
respond to changes in the environment – factor dynamics.  Statistical tests conducted 
show that the genetic algorithm is able to learn the combination of assets (risk 
exposures) that respond asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks, while obtaining 
a high diversification benefit.     
                                                 
13 Propensities understood as objective probabilities where the result of tossing the coin is dependent of the (ever changing) 
environment and not the subjective probabilities used in risk measurement. See Popper (1990) and Reveiz (2001).     19
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